


















Resumo		O	 presente	 artigo	 busca	 traçar	 as	 caraterísticas	 básicas	 da	 existência	 do	direito	 na	 antiga	 tradição	 filosófica	 pré-socrática.	 Analisa-se	 a	responsabilidade	cósmica	de	Anaximandro.	Desenvolvem-se	os	pensamentos	de	 Pitágoras	 sobre	 a	 regulação,	 como	 a	 categoria	 separada	 e	 não	 como	 a	imagem	personificada.	Faz	-se	a	investigação	do	lugar	das	categorias	de	Fogo	e	 Logos	 na	 existência	 do	 direito	 de	 acordo	 com	 as	 ideias	 de	 Heráclito.	 Os	autores	 salientam	 a	 importância	 da	 ontologia	 de	 Parménides	 para	 a	formação	das	imaginações	antigas	sobre	a	existência	do	direito,	bem	como	o	valor	 regulatório	 da	 noção	 de	 amor	 e	 de	 ódio	 nos	 pensamentos	 de	Empédocles.	 Este	 artigo	 analisa	 a	 noção	 da	 natureza	 como	 o	 critério	 de	verdade	e	qualidade	para	as	normas	materiais	de	acordo	com	a	doutrina	do	Demócrito.	
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cosmic	 liability	 of	 Anaximander.	 Pythagoras'	 ideas	 about	 regulation	 are	considered	as	a	separate	category,	not	as	a	personified	 image.	According	to	Heraclitus's	teachings,	it	is	being	researched	the	place	of	the	Fire	and	Logos	categories	 in	 the	 legal	 being.	 The	 author	 clarifies	 the	 importance	 of	Parmenides's	 ontological	 doctrine	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 ancient	 ideas	 about	legal	being,	as	well	as	the	regulatory	value	of	love	and	hate	in	the	notions	of	Empedocles.	The	article	 analyzes	 the	nature	 concept	 as	 a	 criterion	of	 truth	and	quality	for	the	material	rules	pursuant	to	the	Democritus	philosophical	doctrine.	
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Introduction		 We	 were	 trying	 to	 reveal	 the	 content	 of	 the	 legal	 existence	 through	 mythological	personified	images	in	previous	works.	That	have	made	it	possible	to	understand	the	general	reflection	on	the	legal	understanding	of	ancient	Greeks.	However,	it	is	known	that	Hellas	did	not	 live	 just	 by	 a	 single	 myth.	 That	 was	 the	 origin,	 which	 has	 given	 a	 jolt	 to	 much	 more	complex	philosophical	constructions	that	have	already	had	a	concrete	authorship.	The	 worth	 noting	 is	 that	 the	 process	 of	 transition	 to	 specific	 doctrines	 means	 the	personification	of	separate	legal	provisions	of	individuals	but	not	demythologization.	The	 question	 isn’t	 either	 in	 the	 finishing	 the	 old	 or	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	 new	 one.	 The	transition	 from	 "myth"	 to	 "logos"	 is	 that	 one	which	passes	 from	general	 to	 individual,	 from	simple	to	complex	with	the	preservation	and	development	of	already	established	semantics.	It	will	be	analyzed	in	the	future	not	a	single	time.	The	 law	 always	 exists	 on	 the	 edge	 of	 two	 worlds:	 the	 human	 and	 the	 phenomenal,	moreover,	this	position	is	principling	for	understanding	the	existence	of	law.	If	we	leave	this	phenomenon	only	in	the	metaphysical	-	superhuman	dimension,	it	will	be	stuck	in	the	world	of	 theoretical	 and	 speculative	 structures,	 which	 obtain	 intellective,	 but	 lose	 their	 social	importance.	If	we	place	the	law	only	in	the	human	dimension,	then	we	fall	into	the	world	of	a	human’s	 changeable	 will,	 where	 everything	 is	 relatively	 and	 does	 not	 have	 stable	 basics,	where	 everyone	 gets	 their	 own	 rights.	 That’s	 why	 we	 are	 expanding	 not	 the	 research	 of	principles’	system	in	shadows	of	history,	but	of	the	existence	of	law	by	itself	as	one	that	gives	foundation	for	all	legal	reality	to	exist.	In	this	article	we	are	revealing	how	the	function	of	law	can	get	its	origin	in	natural	environment,	in	universal	laws	and	abstract	notions	to	which	the	organizing	 force	 have	 been	 given.	 The	 fundamental	 doctrines	 and	 views	 of	 the	 pre-Socratic	philosophers	are	being	uncovered	in	this	article.		








To	sum	up	the	analysis	of	Anaximander's	expression	it	is	worth	saying	about	the	specific	content	of	 the	 legal	 terms	which	 	 the	philosopher	operates	by,	namely,	 that	the	things	pay	a	fine	 for	 their	 outrage	 .	 “They	 have	 to	 pay	 a	 penalty	 -	 interprets	Nietzsche,”	 they	 pay	 a	 fine	"translates	 Dils,	 -	 for	 his	 injustice”	 (Eberhard,	 2001,	 p.	 57).	 Reading	 Anaximander,	 the	existence	has	been	already	organised	in	that	way		that	it	penalizes	for	improper	behavior,	as	a	result,	 the	 legal	 liability	 is	 the	 emanation	 	 (Latin	 emanation	-	 "leak,	 propagation")	 of	 space	responsibility.	Thus,	 the	 law	 is	only	 anthropological	 shadow	of	ontological	processes,	 it	 is	 a	human	dimension	of	orderly	processes	in	nature.	It's	not	about	the	fact	that	a	person	does	not	affect	 the	 legal	 things,	 but	 about	 that,	 it	 may	 recedes	 from	 the	 given	 basics,	 and	 then	 the	problems,	 the	crisis	always	begin.	The	 task	of	a	man	as	a	 "legal	 creature"	 is	 to	preserve	 the	consciousness	 through	 the	 intention	 for	 the	 legal	 existence	 hierarchy	 and	 not	 to	 try	 to	 be	separated	 from	 the	 already	predetermined	 coordinate	 system.	That's	why,	 according	 to	 the	Anaximander's	 law	-	there	will	be	always	the	retribution	for	all	our	violence.	All	attempts	to	create	 artificial	 inception	 for	 the	 law,	departing	 from	 the	natural	 (for	 example	 -	 totalitarian	systems)	 always	 bring	 forth	 destructive	 processes,	 which,	 in	 the	 end,	 they	 have	 been	subjected	to.		
The	 force	 of	 the	 number	 ordering	 or	 “mathematics	 of	 law”	 by	




the	number	in	law,	despite	of	its	humanitarian	context.	Wherever	it	is	necessary	to	apply	for	a	category	 of	 measurement	 and	 magnitude,	 the	 law	 appeals	 to	 mathematics;	 when	 we	 talk	about	reasonable	terms,	we	still	need	a	numerical	word,	not	to	mention	about	the	concept	of		"sanction	size".	Pythagoras	points	out	about	the	necessity	in	clearly	defined	attributes	of	legal	existence,	not	simply	in	general	terms	of	the	importance	or	aesthetics	principles,	as	it	was	in	case	with	myths.	The	law	is	always	built	on	the	principle	of	"idea	to	system".	For	example,	if	the	idea	is	totalitarian,	 then	 the	 norms	 are	 doomed	 to	 repression,	 and	 vice	 versa	 -	 if	 the	 nature	 is	democratic,	then	the	regulator	gets	a	chance	for	a	humane	face.	
	




either	responds	to	the	highest	divine	laws,	or	is	doomed	to	collapse	(since	lower	one	doesn't	have	authorities	over	the	highest	forces);	the	fire	can't	heat	and	burn	in	this	case.	Once	again	we	are	 convinced	 that	 the	 "regulator"	 always	 exists	 on	 the	bound	of	 two	worlds:	 ideas	 and	things	so	that	the	legal	processes	do	not	break	the	cosmic	hierarchy	of	values.	The	proof	is	the	following	words	 of	Heraclitus:	 ‘Immortals	 are	mortal,	mortals	 immortal,	 living	 the	 death	 of	those,	and	dying	the	life	of	these.	 	Of	all	those	whose	 logos	 I	have	heard,	no	one	reaches	this	conclusion	-	that	the	wise	is	separate	from	all	things’	(Guthrie,	1962,	p.	464).	That	is	why	the	legal	 existence	 on	 its	 content	 cannot	 rely	 on	 the	 separate	 individual's	will,	 it	 is	 part	 of	 the	world	synergy:	“The	people	should	fight	to	defend	nomos	as	their	city	wall”	(Guthrie,	1962,	p.	464).	Now	we	start	 to	understand	 the	 following	philosopher's	 instructions,	because	 the	 law	that	corresponds	to	the	higher	Logos	is	well-intentioned	one,	and	to	which	the	person	aspires	in	the	end,	and	therefore,	he	has	to	keep	it.		
Paramides	 and	 the	 existence;	 or	 the	 independence	 of	 mind	 in	




tautologically,	it	is	possible	that	if	we	separate	the	law	as	a	phenomenon	beyond	the	state	and	suprastate,	 then	only	norms	can	correspond	to	the	specific	 legal	categories	or	vice	versa.	By	determining	 this	measurement,	we	categorically	set	 the	 law	on	a	humane	path,	 it	 receives	a	human	 face	 (but	 not	 a	 violent	 one),	 and	 it	 becomes	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 universal	 human	spiritual	 powers.	 And	 the	 mentioned	 dichotomy	 is	 realized	 through	 the	 delimitation	 of	"legitimacy"	and	"irregularity"	and	specifically	in	the	legal	relationship.	As	 we	 can	 see,	 there	 is	 justification	 in	 the	 insistence	 on	 the	 initial	 divide	 of	 the	 most	general	categories	and	their	supremacy	in	jurisprudence	with	the	following	transition	into	the	particular	single	whole.	Law	does	not	simply	put	in	order	social	relations	-	it	leads	them	to	the	basic	 social	 welfare;	 and	 it	 is	 presented	 as	 the	 intelligence	 (the	 path	 of	 knowledge	 and	ignorance)	in	Parmenides	teachings.	Consequently,	the	doctrine	about	general	being	gives	us	the	opportunity	to	isolate	and	legitimize	the	notion	of	legal	being,	as	well	as	to	understand	the	power	of	independent	pure	mind	in	beholding	and	consolidating	of	the	legal	values.	
	
Empedocle’s	Philia	and	Neikos,	or	the	Legal	Dualism		 The	 naturalistic	 approach	 in	 search	 of	 the	 legal	 existence	 is	 reduced	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 a	particular	natural	element,	with	its	exceptional	features,	acquired	a	self-regulating	role,	from	which	we	receive	a	regulatory	legal	function.	At	the	same	time,	we	encounter	the	doctrine	that	this	 function	 of	 nature	 has	 much	 improved,	 and	 is	 more	 tangent	 to	 the	 modern	 theory	 of	jurisprudence.	 We	 are	 talking	 about	 the	 Empedocles	 philosophy	 and	 the	 division	 of	 two	powers:	love	(philia)	and	enmity	(neikos)	in	the	cosmic	processes.	“That,	what	is	united	with	friendship,	then	it's	again	chased	from	each	other	with	hostility”	(Diogenes	Laertius,	1925).	Thus,	the	philia	is	responsible	for	the	merger	processes,	and	the	neikos	for	separation	and	destruction.	 Doesn't	 it	 lead	 us	 to	 the	 certain	 similarities	 in	 legal	 relationships?	 And	 truly:	regulation	 (static,	 dynamic),	 protection,	 defense.	 These	 are	 the	 functions	 that	 are	 obviously	deduced	from	the	previously	mentioned	cosmic	processes.	The	law	can	be	both	constructive	and	also	can	execute	 the	destructive	role,	necessary	at	 the	same	 time.	Wrongdoings	are	not	just	 a	 side	 effect	 of	 human	 behavior,	 it	 is	 inevitable	 (due	 to	 the	 human	 imperfection	 -	




people,	but	the	natural	superhuman	law	-	the	Logos,	the	philia,	the	physis	etc.	State	law	must	be	 legitimized	 in	 cosmos.	 The	 distance	 from	 the	 processes	 of	 the	 four	 elements	 interaction	and	the	formation	of	everything	to	the	legal	processes	is	much	smaller	than	it	can	be	thought,	because	 we	 are	 inseparable	 from	 the	 nature	 and	 we	 obtain	 our	 knowledge	 through	interaction	 with	 it.	 Therefore,	 the	 human	 law	 is	 not	 taken	 "from	 nothing",	 there	 is	 always	"something"	that	gives	the	foundations	to	its	existence.		
Democritus	 and	 “artificiality”	 of	 law;	 the	 highlight	 of	 natural	 and	
state	in	law		 Despite	of	 the	 fact	 that	 our	 search	 for	 the	 law's	origin	occurs	 in	natural	processes,	 it	 is	clear	 that	 the	 laws	which	we	 follow	and	 for	 the	breaking	of	which	we	are	punished	are	still	being	 created	 and	 executed	 with	 human	 hands,	 the	 natural	 law	 is	 only	 a	 good	 shape	 for	contemplation	 without	 them.	 And	 Democritus	 makes	 precisely	 this	 following	 division	 into	
fusis-nature	 and	 nomos-law:	 "...	 “The	 first	 principles	 of	 the	 universe	 are	 atoms	 and	 empty	space;	 everything	 else	 is	merely	 thought	 to	 exist.”	 "	 (Diogenes	 Laertius,	 1925).	 Such	nature	and	law	identification	is	of	 fundamental	 importance	in	clarifying	the	difference	between	law	and	right,	which	can	be	both	 legal	and	non-legal.	History	shows	us	 that	 the	 law	may	have	a	very	distinct	"face",	and	therefore	there	is	a	great	demand	for	preserving	it	from	its	own	self-worthiness.	That	 is	why,	 the	presence	of	a	norm	existence	 is	not	a	sign	of	 reasonableness	and	well-being	for	Democritus:	"...	The	 laws	would	not	prevent	each	man	from	living	according	to	his	inclination..;	and	it	is	able	to	do	so,	when	they	themselves	wish	to	receive	benefit;	for	it	shows	to	those	who	obey	it	their	own	particular	virtue."	(Nill,	1985,	p.	86).	The	Greeks	often	equated	the	 notion	 of	 law	 and	 the	 notion	 of	 "dike",	 or	 justice.	 As	 we	 see,	 Democritus	 highlighted	positivist	tendencies	in	the	law,	however,	he	did	not	become	a	positivist	himself,	concerning	about	too	unstable	and	volatile	sources	of	state	law	-	the	human	freedom.	Consequently,	what	contradicts	 nature	 is	 unfair,	 and	 therefore,	 untrue.	Nature	 acts	 as	 a	 criterion	of	 truth	 and	 a	quality	 category	 for	 positive	 norms.	 Thus,	 we	 can	 conclude	 that	 not	 everything	 that	 is	happening	in	the	legal	system	is	related	to	the	true	legal	function.	In	our	opinion,	the	natural-legal	and	positivist	scientific	discourses	take	their	origin	from	here.		




The	position	of	the	Sophists	has	been	largely	disproved	by	Socrates,	but	for	our	study	it	is	important	 that	 the	 naturally-legal	 dogmatic	 had	 its	 own	 critique,	 which	 only	 expanded	 the	horizons	of	seeking	for	the	legal	existence.	The	relativism	of	the	Protagoras's	outlook	is	well	described	by	Diogenes	Laertius	(1925)	with	a	concrete	example:	"There	is	a	story	that	one	day	he	demanded	a	payout	from	his	student,	and	he	replied:	"But	I	have	not	yet	won	the	case	at	court!"	Protagoras	said:	"If	we	sue	and	I	win	the	case,	then	you	will	pay,	because	I	won,	if	you	win,	you	will	pay	because	you	won".	From	the	position	of	a	modern	lawyer,	of	course,	there	is	a	reason	to	call	Protagoras	a	wrongdoer,	because	he	speculates	on	the	topic	of	"winning	the	case"	 and	 there	 is	 not	 a	 single	word	 about	 the	 possible	 loss.	 However,	 here	 it	 is	 not	 about	profit,	but	about	the	educational	process,	which	is	in	absolute.	The	actual	state	of	affairs	is	not	important,	but	the	ability	to	substantiate	own	position.	In	this	case,	we	can	set	up	both	existence	and	non-existence	to	all	the	things.	The	modern	politically	legal	reality	does	not	rarely	reflect	exactly	this	state	of	affairs	and	follows	this	law	when	one	and	the	same	act	is	carried	out	by	socially	different	people,	and	differently	qualified.	This	 is	 a	pseudo-truthful	 introversion,	when	 the	 subjective	 is	 placed	over	 the	objective	 and	the	ontological	and	 legal	 favor	 collapses	under	 the	 feet	of	 the	 legal	 system.	We	do	not	 state	that	Protagoras's	thoughts	are	unreliable;	we	merely	ascertain	the	risks	that	these	provisions	hold	for	the	legal	reality.	"...	the	state	has	written	the	laws	and		it	forces	to	either	command	or	obey	in	accordance	with	them"	(Diogenes	Laertius,	1925).	Not	surprisingly,	the	legal	existence	cannot	be	extended	beyond	the	boundaries	of	a	human	and	the	state	as	a	social	phenomenon	in	the	Sophists	philosophy,	since	there	is	no	power	over	the	state,	and	only	the	state	is	legally	empowered	with	 the	violence	 features,	 it	 is	doomed	 to	 force	 to	 something	without	external	(natural)	criteria,	but	not	to	create	goodness.	
	




5.	 Empedocles’s	 doctrine	 states	 that	 philia	 -	 love	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 processes	 of	consolidation,	 and	 neikos	 -	 hate	 is	 in	 charge	 of	 separation	 and	 destruction.	 Legal	 being	 is	created	 in	 such	a	way	 that	 the	 forces	of	unification	and	separation	do	not	 follow	 from	each	other,	but	they	are	predetermined.	6.	The	ontological	discourse	of	Democritus	convinces	that	something	which	contradicts	to	nature	 is	 unfair,	 and	 therefore	 not	 legal.	 The	 nature	 performs	 as	 a	 criterion	 of	 truth	 and	 a	category	 for	positive	norms.	Thus,	we	conclude	 that	not	everything	 that	 is	happening	 in	 the	legal	system	is	related	to	the	true	legal	function.		
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